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INTRODUCTION
Formal thinking about the "tragedy of the commons"  is derived from studies of
fisheries.  Indeed, the problem of common property resources is also known as "the
fisherman's problem" (McEvoy). For fishes and other renewable  living resources, there
are relationships  between mortality and production-or effort and yield-that look
like a logistic Lotka-Volterra curve. In theory, there is a level of mortality that results
in maximum  sustained yield  (MSY).  Those  using this  model have  assumed  that
management involves government rules that keep fishing mortality more or less at the
MSY level, and important fisheries today are managed roughly in this way.
To the biologists' concern  about MSY, economists  added their own concern
with maximum economic yield or profitability;  they then showed howv open access
affects both. Marginal returns to capital-i.e., where money made from fishing is no
greater than the cost of fishing-is the point at which people will stop. But that is far
beyond both MSY and the point of maximum sustained profitability. That also is the
basis of a long-standing argument for limiting access to fisheries, an argument that in
the past decade has become an enthusiastic  chorus  for creating  exclusive rights  to
fish or fishing-the  "private concern" of this paper.
Almost  always,  the  models used  to understand  the interactive  dynamics  of
fisheries  stop at  this point  because  most  of us  in  America  are  wedded  to  two
paradigms: conservation and rationalization (Charles, p. 384-385). The first of these
paradigms is concerned  with taking care of the fish (or birds or forests); the second,
with the pursuit of economic returns. Conservation in America has long been marked
by tension between the  two.
But  there  is  a third paradigm,  "the  social/community  paradigm,"  involving
questions about distributional equity, community welfare, and other social and cultural
benefits. The "social/community paradigm" is absent in most discussions of  tragedies
of the commons  and natural  resource management.  It is, however, expressed in the
metaphor "comedies of the commons," which describes people as social beings who
are trying to come  to some collective  agreement about  common problems.  In  the
bioeconomic model, people are asocial beings, responding as individuals to incentives
from the natural  environment and the market; any limits on their behavior (such as
TAC's or limited licenses) implicitly come from the outside, from a wiser government.
But we know that even fishers care and try to do something about the resources on
which they  depend and  may play  important  roles in the  creation  and enforcement
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disproportionality  and  inequality  in  both  the  causes  and  consequences  of
environmental  problems.  And,  it points  to a  focus  on collective  action  and other
social responses to environmental  problems.
Bad Habits and a New Typology
<-- Common Property  X  Description of Resources.  Scholarly writing on,
thinking  about and practice  concerning  problems  of the commons  have been in a
tangle. One reason is the practice of using the phrase "common property" to refer to
resources  that  share certain  features-e.g.,  fluidity,  mobility,  extensiveness.  The
error is the failure to recognize that property derives not from nature, but from culture.
It does not refer to things, but to social agreements  on how humans relate to things.
A key argument of the revisionist perspective on "commons" issues, therefore,
is that one should distinguish between the features of the resource  and those of the
ways  people choose to relate to the resource and to each other. Vincent and Elinor
Ostrom long ago argued for use of the term "common pool" (rather than "common
property")  for that  class of resources  that are  particularly problematic  to human
institutions  because of the difficulties of  bounding or dividing them, excluding or
controlling the activities of potential users, and handling their "subtractibility"  (i.e.,
the likelihood one person's actions may affect another's enjoyment of the resource).
In that case, examples of common-pool resources would include rivers, large bodies
of water, fishes and other wildlife, air and airwaves, and even information and genetic
material-all of which have certain natural features in common.
Simpler and  other definitional  schemes  abound.  Still,  the point here is  that
"common pool"  is  not the  same as  "common property."  There  could be cases of
common property for non common-pool resources (e.g., condominium housing), and
of private  property  for common-pool  resources  (e.g.,  buying  tickets for access  to
camping in public wilderness areas).
<- CommonProperty  ~￿  Open  Access.  A  second  reason  for  an
intellectual  muddle derives from treating "common property" as synonymous with
"open  access"  or  "no  property  rights."  Although  open  access is  a  distinctive
"commons"  problem,  it is  not  definitive  of common  property. The  "comedy"
perspective insists that there is  an important difference.
Common property is about  property rights.  Common property  systems  can
include restrictions  on who is a proper "commoner" and on what people may do. It
can even be a social agreement to have  open access and no restrictions.
To reiterate, common property is  a cultural artifact,  socially constructed and
contested. It is not a natural or necessary condition.  In this way it is distinct from the
condition  of open access, as used  in economic models.  It is  distinct  even though
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as  open  access.
In the "thin" (cf. Little) version of this perspective, neo-institutional economists
and others emphasize the contingency of economic behavior on legal-social contexts
(Bromley). Property is not created because one or two individuals behave in certain
ways.  Rather, property arises from public choice, requiring some degree of community
consideration  and agreement.  Anthropologists,  on the  other hand,  are  likely to
"thicken" the analysis with more detailed specification of  content, context and culture
(McCay and Acheson).
Property Rights and Management Regimes:  A New Typology
The revisionist view recognizes that the natural environment may be dealt with
in many different ways, with many different consequences.  Common pool resources
may be under a variety of management regimes that are not adequately  indicated by
the  term "common property."  In  a recent  set of articles, we used regimes loosely
identified  as open access (no governance),  communal property, state property and
private  property (Berkes  et al.; Feeny et al.,  p.  4, listing many other references  to
similar  distinctions).  In traditional analyses,  the  first three  types of management
regime are more often lumped as "common property."  Yet, splitting the category and
examining case studies shows that there is no simple one-to-one relationship between
regime and outcome, including whether the outcome  is sustainable exploitation. The
revisionist perspective plainly and simply leads to doubt that environmental problems
are due to the "common property" attribute of some resources (Feeny et al.,  p.  13).
I propose that we go further to distinguish between property claims (one class
of institutions) and management regimes (another class).  To keep the analysis, only
three general types of property are  listed: private  property, common property and
open access. The management  regimes  are laissez-faire, market, communal, state
and  international.
Open access is the null condition of no property claims. For some purposes it
may be appropriate to distinguish this case from a socially constructed agreement that
all citizens, inhabitants,  or members of "the public" have rights of use.
"Private  property  " usually is defined in terms of exclusivity and transferability
(e.g., Regier and Grima). Private property rights are more exclusive and generally-
but not universally-more transferable  than common property rights. It is essential,
however,  to recognize  the  potential variability  of the  "bundles  of rights"  (as  the
lawyers say) for private, as well as common property.
"Common property" refers  to  a  large  class  of property  rights  that can
incorporate  much of what is thought of in these  schemes  as state  property (as  in
Feeny et  al.). An anthropological  point to be made  here is  that it  is  dangerous  to
generalize,  given  the  specificity  of particular  property  systems  and  their
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draw general  outlines of what often is meant in specific  cases. Among the features
typically  found  are a  right to  use  something  in common with  others or  not to  be
excluded  from the use of something (Macpherson),  as well as some  expression of
equality or equitability in the allocation of rights. In some cases people may have use
rights, but not exchange rights.
The boundaries of common  property are much more variable.  They may be
virtually nonexistent,  as with the Swedish custom of allmennsretten, which allows
anyone  to harvest wild mushrooms or berries on private  lands. They  may be very
tightly circumscribed, as in some village systems where common rights are contingent
on citizenship  or on land ownership.
The boundaries of "the commons" and "the commoners"  vary in permeability.
They may be very permeable in terms of access-e.g., where a local community takes
care of a resource, but allows others to come in to harvest it while following community
rules. This kind of permeable system is fairly typical of indigenous peoples, but also
can be found more widely, as in the case of municipal care of a coastal beach to which
the  larger public  has access,  upon paying a beach  or parking  fee (the New Jersey
system).  On  the  other hand,  systems  can be tightly  circumscribed,  so  that  only
legitimate members of certain communities  have any rights.
Property Rights  z  Management  Regimes
For purposes  of  a "thicker"  comparative  analysis,  a first step is  to separate
property rights from management regimes. Property rights are among the institutional
conditions that influence management regimes, but they are not the same. Following
is a crude typology that might  emerge from making a distinction between property
rights and management regimes.
Laissez-faire-the  condition of no management regime-replaces open access
in the scheme  of Feeny et al.  Systems  in which people have  open-access  property
rights can  also  be systems  in which they  must  follow rules  and  are  engaged  in
collective action. Thus, it is important to be clear that laissez-faire is the big problem,
not open access per se. The combination of laissez-faire  with open access is indeed
prone to "tragedies  of the commons,"  if pressure on resources  is high.
In the same manner, market regulation  is distinct from private property. Private
property is relevant to management insofar as it allows market mechanisms to work
more effectively. Yet, governance  is required to uphold private property claims and
other conditions of the market. This combination can be a source of both "tragedies
of the commoners" and tragedies of misplaced faith in market remedies-particularly
if "externalities" and long-term, indirect ecological effects are involved.
Communal governance is  distinct from  common  or communal  property.  It
highlights the existence and the potential of  user-governance  and local-level  systems
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State governance is distinct from state property,  recognizing the central role
of the state to most common-pool  systems,  whatever their ownership.  On the one
hand, state property can be property owned outright by the state and used exclusively
by agents of the state. On the other hand, it can be property that is deemed public-
property over which the state exercises governance.  The latter is the more important
situation,  and the concept of state governance  reflects that fact.
A  significant  addition  to common-pool  resource  analyses  is international
governance. It  has features  of and challenges  to  common-pool  management  that
differ from state, if not communal governance. One such feature/challenge, for example,
is the absolute lack of centralized enforcement.
In sum, property rights  are not the  same  as management  systems,  although
they  are  logically  connected.  Open  access  is  not the  same as  laissez-faire.  Even
though  most  laissez-faire  systems  are  open-access,  there  are  many  open-access
systems in which rules and regulations  abound.  Private property is not the same as
market regulation,  even though the "tragedy of the commons" theory holds that the
problem with the commons  is that market regulation does not work. Market forces
certainly  apply across the board wherever the activity  is linked to markets, but the
regulatory  incentives  of markets  work best  where there  is  something like private
property.  Of course, private property rights are no guarantee  that their owners will
care about resource conservation. Moreover, a "tragedy of the non-commons" (May)
can occur when privatization benefits the few, but further marginalizes the many, who
are  forced  to  increase  their uses  and weaken their  management of common-pool
resources.
Common property is not the same as communal  regulation,  either.  It is possible
for communal regulation to exist while access is open. It also is very possible that a
community  can regulate  how  private property  owners  use  their  properties  (e.g.,
zoning),  reflecting concern  about externalities  and shared community  values. But
communal  regulation  probably  works best  where members  of a community  have
special rights-property  rights.
For example, after gaining independence from colonial domination, many new
nations have done away with communal  or common property rights because these
rights  have  been  linked with  clans  and other groups  seen  as  problematic  to  the
emerging nation-state.  This has weakened and destroyed the customary systems of
resource management.
State and  international  management  regimes (usually meant by "governance")
crosscut all forms of  property. "The state" (meaning the centralized government that
holds a virtual monopoly on the use of force and is the final arbiter of law) is critical
to the existence of both private and common property. It legitimizes and protects-or
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is  particularly  challenging  as  the  solution  of regional  and  global environmental
problems,  for the so-called "free rider" problem inherent to all commons dilemmas is
"writ large,"  and there is no real centralized system of enforcement.
Comedies  of the  Commons
The "tragedy of the commons"  approach  leads to arguments for:  (1) strong,
centralized governance or (2) privatization,  letting the market do the job. From the
revisionist point of view, a broader and more complex range of alternatives  comes
into view.  They  include  a stronger  emphasis  on the potentials of people  as social
actors  to  manage  their  affairs-i.e.,  on  more  decentralized  and  cooperative
management or what is here meant by "comedy of the commons"  (cf. Smith; Rose).
Tragedy in the classic Greek sense is the drama of an individual who has a tragic flaw
or relationship  with the gods and is inevitably propelled to some tragic destiny. In a
comedy,  on the other hand, people  recognize  that  something is  wrong;  still, they
try-for better or worse and often "comically"-to  do something about it.
Communal Management
Margaret McKean recently compared what she has learned about more than two
centuries  of common property land management on the north slope of Mount Fuji,
Japan, with what others have learned from studying landed commons  in medieval
England,  Switzerland,  Morocco,  Nepal, India and the Andean highlands.  She also
compared what she has found with some irrigation and fisheries management cases.
Her goal was to find out what makes for successful communal management (McKean,
p. 258-261; see also Ostrom 1987, 1990):
1. Clear understanding of who is and is not eligible to use the commons.
2.  Some way  for eligible  users or their representatives  to meet regularly  in
order to air grievances, adjudicate problems, and make decisions and rules.
3. Jurisdiction that mostly is independent of larger government powers.
4.  Limited transferability of property rights.
5. Ability of the system to handle social and economic differences.
6.  Close attention to monitoring and enforcement.
A good example could be found in New Jersey in the late 1970s and early 1980s
(McCay 1980). The Fishermen's Dock Cooperative of Point Pleasant had developed
a complex system of catch limits for two species that were critical to the fishery during
the winter months and were subject to sharp price declines when the market was glutted.
The  system met  all of the criteria  emphasized by McKean.  Only members  of the
cooperative were eligible. They met regularly to make decisions and air grievances.
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administering the catch rules were created to handle differences in capital and skill-
rewarding both, yet maintaining a sense of fairness. Both monitoring and enforcement
were relatively easy.  The boats had to land their catches and follow the rules to stay
in the  co-op.  In addition-speaking  to  a  question not  handled  too well  by  most
scholars  of common  property  management-the  Point  Pleasant  fishermen  were
capable of expanding the boundaries of their "self-regulation"  to others within the
larger region when it seemed important and necessary.
Some  might  say the  system was too  specific  and limited  to be  applicable
elsewhere-i.e.,  to be of interest to fisheries managers in government agencies. But
"this very same factor may also be used to suggest that a reasonable  alternative or
adjunct to centralized, large-scale systems of fisheries management does exist. Some
management systems may persist and work best where they remain on a scale small
and flexible enough to be adjusted to the particular problems and circumstances  of
the  people  inherent  in  them  and  yet capable  at  times  (as  I  have  shown  in  the
description) of being extended to a regional level" (McCay, p. 36).
There are many other systems of communal management, including some that
are relatively new. A general notion arising from the case studies is that if a group of
people have some sort of territorial or  jurisdictional claim to a valuable resource, they
will be motivated and empowered to manage it better. This is critical where government
resources and the political will required for enforcement  of regulations  are scarce.
Some systems are experiments  introduced by outsiders.  Others developed locally.
Major obstacles exist on the route to the self-governance  way of managing the
commons.  Self-governance  may be impractical  where resources  are  migratory or
overlap jurisdictions,  as in the fisheries  of the temperate  and northern regions.  In
addition, self-governance may be unacceptable where it excludes people with claims
to common use rights, based on historical use or other notions of right.
For  example,  it  is  possible  to  interpret  New  Jersey's  system  of giving
municipalities the power to regulate access to coastal beaches as a good example of
self-governance.  People  who  go to the  beach  must pay for beach  badges  and/or
parking, and that money is used by the towns to maintain the beaches. Very little of
the coast is a state or federal park.  At the same time, however, courts have accepted
that the intent and consequence  often is exclusionary, favoring local residents. As a
result, the courts  have delimited the power of the towns because under public trust
law, all citizens have common rights of access to the tidewaters  and oceans.
Co-Management and User Participation
The revisionist  perspective  emphasizes  communal  management  and  self-
governance. But there are clear limits and drawbacks to self-governance, including
the migratory or fugitive nature of some resources,  overlapping jurisdictions,  and
competing claims  (e.g.,  the special rights of local people who depend on a resource,
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the question often comes down to the ways that common-pool resource users interact
with the state in developing, implementing  and changing systems of governance.
The term "co-management"  has come into use to introduce the topic of how
common-pool resource users interact with the state in developing,  implementing and
changing systems of resource management.  Co-management is but one of a variety
of forms of government-public  interaction for which public participation is central
(Jentoft  and  McCay;  McCay  and Jentoft  1996).  But,  it  grants  more power  and
responsibility  than do advisory  or  consultative  systems.
Co-management  where power  is  actually  shared has  received  considerable
attention as an institutional response to the "commons" problem-i.e., the question
of how private interests  can better intermesh with collective interests. In theory, co-
management  will improve  both the  effectiveness  and  the equitability  of fisheries
management (Jentoft; Pinkerton). Co-management also may improve compliance with
agreed-upon  rules.
Effectiveness is partly a question of accurate appraisal of the situation and partly
the effects of changing the rules. Resource assessment is critical, but it seems logical
that under a co-management system, resource users would be more likely than they are
under other systems to share accurate information. And, as fishers become-and are
treated as-responsible co-managers, this would be reflected by even more fundamental
changes in behavior and attitudes. Co-management  is one of the ways that "indigenous"
and nonexpert knowledge  and interests can be meaningfully brought into management.
There are other arguments  for co-management systems, including the likelihood
that such systems will be more equitable. This argument is based on the premise that
resource  users are more  familiar with the intricacies  of local  social and economic
situations;  therefore,  those users can  respond to the  special needs  and interests  of
different groups or individuals better than governments  can, because  governments
usually try to treat everyone alike. In addition, a co-managed regulatory process may
be more responsive to changing conditions. The organizations of those resource users
who are involved may be able to change rules more quickly and in general be more
flexible and responsive than government.
Private Concerns
Few would disagree with the proposition that open access can generate resource
abuse and economic losses. This is really what Hardin was modeling in his sketch of
"the tragedy of the commons" and what H. Scott Gordon meant by common property
fishing in his seminal article on the dynamics of overfishing.
Nor is  there  much  to argue  about  concerning  the value  of delineating  and
enforcing  property rights  when conservation  is  a  problem. Some  specification  of
property rights is  a necessary foundation  to the development  of regulation.
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access. That jump is toward  a prescription of creating  private property  in rights to
resources.
In fisheries,  privatization involves the creation of exclusive use rights  in fish
stocks (typically, as percentages  of a quota), with more or less freedom to transfer
these rights. These  are the hallmarks of a marketable  commodity. The idea was an
extension from  work done  by economists  who, while  dealing with environmental
pollution problems, introduced the idea oftradeable emissions permits.  These ITQ's
(individual transferable  quotas) are widely praised for solving the problems of "the
commons," combining a quota for conservation purposes with a way of restoring the
ability of the market to generate efficiencies  in the use of a resource.
There is  nothing  inherently right  or wrong  about market-based  solutions  to
environmental and resource management problems (Young and McCay). They enable
the use of market regulation for common property, but change the property rights in
the direction of exclusion.  Whether this is good or bad depends  on the specifics  of
a particular  situation-including  the  goals of management,  as  framed within  the
goals and expectations of a society. Studies now are underway in a variety of regions,
to look at the implications of ITQ's and related measures in fisheries (McCay et al., in
press; Palsson  and Helgason,  in press).
Whether private  ownership  creates conditions  for a  level of stewardship  or
resource  conservation  that  compensates  for  the  social  costs  entailed  in  the
concentration  of power  (as  well  as  in the  alienation  of many  from the  means  of
production involved) is an important question. It is difficult to discern the mechanisms
by which privatized fishing rights translate  into conservation;  ITQ systems are still
dependent  on  government-imposed  or co-managed  regulations  on  catches  and
technology (Mace). Moreover, private property owners are quite willing and able to
overexploit and push  to extinction  "their" resources,  if the  price  is  right and  the
future  holds  other options-  as  Colin  Clark  demonstrated  long ago  for whaling
(Clark).  In addition, as  shown throughout  the world, privatization  can create  new
pressures on the remaining commons where accumulation of privatized property by
the few pushes the majority to more marginal lands or to overexploiting their customary,
communal lands.
The Embeddedness of Things
All models are simplified abstractions. As such, they provide important clues
about how things work,  but they also can be misleading.
One of the problems with models of human behavior such as the "tragedy of
the commons"  is that much that is important about behavior and its consequences
has been factored out. This includes: (1) the many dimensions of social relationships
and culture; (2) varying ways of appraising both past and future; and (3)  the particulars
of the historical, ecological  and socioeconomic  situations of the people and natural
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A co-management  or "comedy"  perspective  can make  the same mistake. At
some point-ideally, before policy is set-the richer and more complicated context of
a natural resource problem will come into the decisionmaking arena.
In closing, I offer a few remarks on the cultural and historical specificity and
embeddedness  of "the commons,"  to underscore  the point that misuse of the term
"common property" as meaning the same thing as "no property rights at all" is arguably
a distinctive part of the American experience. In  language and culture, Americans
generally have lost a sense of "common property" as property. With the rise of radical
individualism, capitalist practice  and liberal economic theory, property  came to  be
seen only as an individual right to exclude others from the use or benefit of something
(i.e., private property), even though  logically and historically property pertains to a
broader class of individual rights-including the individual right not to be excluded
from something (Macpherson, p. 202). Telling is the fact that the Library of Congress
cataloging system does not have a subject heading for "common property" (excepting
the  very  recent use  of "commons"  and "natural  resources,  communal"  for the
revisionist literature I have cited).
This  gets  to  the  core  of one  of the  major political  problems  affecting
environmentalist  goals in the United States  today:  The  rise of a "private  property
rights" movement in reaction to attempts to use the common property dimensions of
the legal doctrine of "public trust" for environmentalist objectives.  Common property
has lost  its status  as anything  other  than the  general power of the  state, under the
rubric of legal  doctrines  and the general  sentiment  of "public trust,"  reducing  the
issue to one of compensable "taking," versus private property rights.
It can reemerge,  however, as a more positive figure of speech that recognizes
such things as having the right not to be excluded-from decisionmaking, as well as
use-and  the critical importance of having those with genuine interests, experience
and knowledge involved  in natural resource management.
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